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This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement 
literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is 
strongly affected by pension incentives.  We combine administrative and self-reported pension 
data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives.  While 
virtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, we 
document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.  
Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.  
In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives rather 
than being unresponsive to any measured incentives.   
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   This paper addresses an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while 
most people do not know the details of their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly 
affected by pension incentives.  The answer we find is intuitive: people respond to incentives that 
they know about.  Estimated responses of retirement to financial incentives are driven by a 
minority of the population who are well-informed about those incentives.  Our empirical 
approach combines administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement 
response to actual and perceived financial incentives.  We find that uninformed people show no 
response to their actual retirement incentives while well-informed people respond much more 
than previously thought.   
Understanding how responsiveness to pension incentives is related to knowledge of these 
incentives is important for policy discussions.  Virtually all of the recent empirical research on 
responsiveness to financial retirement incentives is based on administrative data, and several 
recent studies use their estimates to simulate or forecast the response to policy changes such as 
altering the normal retirement age or benefit levels.
1  While such estimates may accurately 
capture an average effect, we find that this average masks a tremendous amount of heterogeneity 
in individual responsiveness that is directly related to individuals’ knowledge of pension 
incentives.  Because alternative policy changes and their specific implementation will almost 
certainly be associated with different levels of transparency and public knowledge, we need to 
understand how this knowledge interacts with the incentives to accurately predict which types of 
individuals are most likely to respond and what their responses will be. 
  Our findings also have important implications beyond understanding retirement behavior.  
While much applied economic research seeks to measure the responsiveness of individuals to  
                                                 
1 For example, see Coile and Gruber (2000), or Samwick (1998).    2 
 
certain incentives, we are aware of no other study that has made such a direct comparison 
between the responsiveness to self- and administratively-reported measures of incentives.  The 
issues raised in this study are relevant to a variety of economic policies.  For example, would 
individuals respond more strongly to the various tax-favored savings vehicles if they knew what 
these complex incentives are?
2  And, would workers respond differently to the earned income tax 
credit if they realized the precise marginal tax rate at each level of earnings?  At a minimum, our 
results suggest that heterogeneity in individual knowledge can lead to significant heterogeneity 
in responses.  The availability of self- and employer-reported pension data provides a unique 
opportunity to quantify the extent to which individuals’ lack of information is related to reduced 
responsiveness to economic incentives. 
Our analysis below uses self-reported, employer-reported and Social Security 
Administration data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  To examine the relationship 
between knowledge of retirement benefits and individuals’ responsiveness to those benefits, we 
begin by calculating two versions of financial retirement incentives, one based on self-reported 
data, and another based on employer-reported or administrative data.  It is straightforward to 
show that both versions of these incentives affect retirement, and that the self-reports continue to 
be strongly significant determinants of retirement even after controlling for the employer reports.  
We then use the self-reports to construct summary measures of individuals’ knowledge of their 
pension plans.  When these knowledge measures are interacted with the incentives based on 
employer-provided data, we show that the better-informed fraction of the population generates 
all of the average response to pension incentives, and that the ill-informed segment of the 
population show no significant response.  We further show that this ill-informed population is 
not completely unresponsive to any incentives, but rather, they are responsive to their own 
                                                 
2 Recent work by Duflo and Saez (2003), further described below, suggests the answer to this question is yes.   3 
 
misperception of the incentives.   
Our analyses draw upon two strands of the recent retirement literature.  The first of these 
includes studies that examine the extent of information that individuals possess about their future 
retirement benefits.  The common finding across these studies is that such information is 
typically quite incomplete.  The work of Gustman and Steinmeier (2001a, 2001c) using the HRS 
sets the stage for our work.
3  They examine the determinants of knowledge of Social Security 
and private pensions, and the implications of this knowledge for retirement planning.  They find, 
for example, that only half of respondents can correctly identify the type of pension plan (defined 
benefit versus defined contribution) in which they participate, and that age, union membership, 
longer planning horizons and certain retirement planning activities signal individuals who are 
better informed about their pensions.  In addition, they find that workers who initially 
overestimate their available benefits retire later than they had originally planned. 
A related part of the literature shows the potential for behavioral responses to 
interventions that alter individuals’ information sets.  Duflo and Saez (2003) demonstrate that 
small incentives that encourage individuals to learn more about retirement savings vehicles can 
have significant effects on participation in retirement savings plans.  Their results echo earlier 
findings by Bernheim and Garrett (2003) that show large effects of financial education on 
individual savings and other behavior. 
Also related to the lack of knowledge about pension incentives is work by Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian and Metrick (2001).  They find that employees tend to follow the “path of least 
resistance” and that the default options in an employers’ pension plan have a major impact on  
                                                 
3Other studies include Mitchell (1988) who uses pension information provided by employers and workers in the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, and Luchak and Gunderson (2000) who examine pension information among 
employees of a unionized public utility industry in Canada.    4 
 
participation in the plan and on the participants’ saving behavior and investment portfolio.  
While this is not evidence of a lack of knowledge per se, it is certainly consistent with individual 
behavior that does not pay much attention to knowing or caring about finances and financial 
incentives.   
  The second strand of relevant literature includes virtually all studies that examine the 
effects of private pension incentives on retirement and much of the related work on Social 
Security incentives.  Many papers have utilized data from employer-reports or administrative 
sources and they have generally found that individuals are quite responsive to the financial 
incentives embedded in pension plans and Social Security.  Stock and Wise (1990), and 
Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) estimate both structural and reduced-form models of the 
retirement decision using data provided by a single large employer.  Samwick (1998) uses the 
employer-provided data on private pensions from the Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate a 
regression-based counterpart to existing structural models of retirement, focusing on the role of 
forward-looking financial retirement incentives, or “option value” in determining the probability 
of retirement.  In a similar approach, both Coile and Gruber (2000) and Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2001b) use employer-provided pension data, along with administrative records of Social 
Security earnings histories to estimate the effect of private pensions and Social Security on 
retirement.  Our analyses below is the first to provide a direct link between this literature that 
uses administrative data to study retirement behavior, and the growing evidence that many of 
these incentives are not well understood by the individuals whose decisions we are modeling. 
A possible explanation for why individuals seem to respond to incentives that they do not 
apparently know is that individuals do know but self-reported pension data are so inaccurately 
measured that they provide a misleading picture of individual knowledge.  We present evidence   5 
 
below that this is unlikely to be the case.  While it is almost certainly true that self-reported 
pension data are measured with some error, financial incentive measures based on these self-
reported data are significant predictors of retirement behavior, even after conditioning on 
incentives based on administrative data.  This confirms results from Chan and Stevens (2004) 
that finds, after controlling for earlier retirement expectations or individual-specific fixed effects, 
the self-reported financial incentives are still important determinants of retirement behavior. 
Thus, another key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that self-reported data, 
while largely ignored by economists when administrative data are available, do provide relevant 
information.  This is an important finding given the extensive effort devoted to the collection of 
self-reported data, and the rarity with which some of these data have been used by economists to 
study behavior.  If self-reported data are truly so poorly measured as to be uninformative, that 
would raise questions of whether they should continue to be collected.  However, as we illustrate 
below in the case of retirement decision-making, the self-reported data are extremely useful in 
understanding how these decisions are made.   
 
 
I.  Data and Samples 
 
  We use data from the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
including: (i) the self-reported, publicly released data on retirement income sources, retirement 
behavior, and retirement expectations, (ii) the employer-provided pension plan details, and (iii) 
the Social Security earnings histories, which allow us to calculate individuals’ Social Security 
benefits at alternative future retirement dates.  Several points should be made regarding these   6 
 
data sources. 
  First, the employer-provided pension data are available only for jobs held at or before 
wave 1 of the survey, while self-reported pension data are available for all waves.  Similarly, the 
administrative earnings histories include Social Security covered earnings only up to the initial 
wave.  However, it is possible to use the employer-provided data to judge the accuracy of self-
reported private pension information because job changes are not very frequent at this age range.  
Individuals who do change employers before retirement are dropped from our samples, as is the 
small fraction of individuals who report changes to their pension plans between waves.
4  The 
wage histories from Social Security records are supplemented with self-reported earnings in 
subsequent years so that Social Security benefits can be calculated for later waves as well.  
Because of this projection of the administrative data to subsequent waves, we control for the 
survey wave in our analysis and compare results across the initial and later waves.   
  Second, we follow many previous researchers in assuming that the employer and Social 
Security administrative data represent the true benefit information.  In some cases, particularly 
with respect to the employer reports, this assumption may not be accurate.  For defined 
contribution pension accounts in particular, there are good reasons to expect that the employer 
reports could deviate from the truth (as we discuss below).  Thus, throughout the analysis, we 
have also examined the sub-sample of workers with defined benefit plans since we are more 
confident about relying on their employer reports as the “true” pension.  However, we find little 
evidence of systematic differences across pension plan types.  We also consider how 
measurement error in the employer-reported data might affect interpretation of our estimates.  
                                                 
4 Individuals are asked whether there have been any changes to their pension plans since the previous survey.  They 
are then asked about the details of their pensions, even if they report no change since the previous wave.   7 
 
  Third, while the self-reported data are useful because they reflect what individuals 
actually know, many researchers have expressed concerns that self-reports may contain 
substantial measurement error.  They may differ from the employer reports not only because 
individuals do not know the information, but also because they misreport this information.  
While this is certainly a concern, we believe that the potential importance of understanding how 
knowledge affects retirement decision-making overrides the concern about measurement error.  
Indeed, our results described below demonstrate that there are large and statistically significant 
differences between informed and uninformed individuals and these differences may be 
understated if our measures of knowledge are severely affected by measurement error.   
  Using the self- and employer-reported data on pensions, our first step is to take the 
pension plan details and use them to construct the present value of pension wealth available to 
the individual at each possible future retirement age.  Following previous literature, we construct 
financial incentive measures that are based on the difference between: (i) the present value of 
pension wealth if an individual retires at the future date that maximizes his or her present value 
of pension wealth, and (ii) the present value of pension wealth if an individual retires today.  We 
refer to this measure as an individual’s “pension gain”:  
[1]  GAINit = PV ( pension wealth if R = argmax(t+1 - ∞) [PV(pension wealth)] )  
– PV (pension wealth if R=t)          
where GAINit is the pension gain of individual i at time t, and R is the retirement date.
 5 
  For individuals self-reporting defined benefit (DB) pensions, we have information on 
annual benefit amounts, the normal retirement (pension eligibility) age, the early retirement age,  
                                                 
5This is similar to the option value concept used in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992), and Samwick (1998), 
equivalent to the “peak value” used by Coile and Gruber (2000) and related to the “premium value” used by 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001b).     8 
 
cost of living adjustments, and benefit reduction amounts in the case of early retirement from 
each survey wave.  For those reporting defined contribution (DC) pensions, we have information 
on the current account balance, employer- and own-contributions, and basic portfolio allocation 
decisions for existing DC accounts.  These pieces of data are combined to generate estimates of 
the present value of pension wealth at each possible retirement age.  The employer-provided 
reports, while more detailed, contain similar information for each pension plan.  In calculating 
the present discounted value of pension wealth at each retirement age, we assume a discount 
factor of 3 percent, and weight future values by age- and gender-specific survival probabilities 
taken from Social Security Administration actuarial tables.   
  Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample.  To be included in the analyses, 
individuals must have an employer-reported pension plan, and cannot yet be retired at the time of 
the wave 1 survey.  We consider the probability of retirement at each different age between the 
wave 1 and wave 4 surveys.  Observations from the wave 1 survey are excluded, since (by our 
sample definition) all retirements occur following wave 1.  Individuals remain in the sample 
through wave 4, or until they retire.  Roughly 13 percent of all observations reflect a retirement 
in the current year, while 34 percent of individuals in our sample have retired by the time of the 
wave 4 survey.  Slightly more than half of the sample is male, and the average age is just over 58 
years.  The sample includes 5 percent Hispanic respondents and 16 percent black respondents.  
More than three-quarters of the sample members are married.   
  The lower section of Table 1 provides means for key summary measures of pension 
wealth, based on both self- and employer-reports.  The average level of pension wealth 
(assuming the individual retires in the current year) is approximately $69,000 (in 1992 dollars) 
based on self-reports, but is more than $153,000 based on the employer-reports.  The average   9 
 
pension gain (the present value of pension wealth if retirement occurs at the wealth-maximizing 
age minus the present value if retirement occurs today) is somewhat higher in the self-reports: 
$56,534 versus $25,152 from the employer-reports.  However, if we consider median values of 
pension gain, this ranking is reversed: the median pension gain based on self reports is $0, while 
the median pension gain from employer reports is $11,545. 
  Table 2 presents some summary statistics of variables intended to describe the accuracy 
of individuals’ self-reported pension values.  First, following the basic strategy of Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2001a), we consider whether individuals report “don’t know” when asked about the 
value of their pension.  Specifically, we construct a variable, REPORT, that is equal to one for 
individuals who report enough of the key components of their pension plans to allow us to 
construct the present value of benefits at various possible retirement ages.
6  If individuals report 
not knowing some major component of their pension, REPORT is set equal to zero.  As noted by 
Gustman and Steinmeier, a large fraction of individuals report not knowing the value of their 
pension.  In our sample, just over a third have REPORT equal to zero.   
  An alternative measure used in previous work is to compare the present value of an 
individual’s level of pension wealth based on the self-report with that based on the administrative 
report.
7  To implement this, we create a variable KNOW_LEVEL that is equal to one if (i) the 
ratio of the self-reported to employer-reported pension wealth is between 0.5 and 2, or (ii) one of 
the reported pension wealth values is zero and the other is less than $5,000.  The second 
component of this definition is included to avoid misclassifying as uninformed those who report  
                                                 
6 These key components for defined benefit plans include normal and early retirement ages, benefit amounts per 
year, and benefit reduction rates for early retirement.  For defined contribution plans we require current account 
balances, along with own and employer annual contributions. 
7 Gustman and Steinmeier (2001a), for example, create a variable equal to one if the self-report is within 25 percent 
of the administrative report of pension wealth.   10 
 
zero wealth rather than very small amounts of pension wealth.  For those who do not report 
enough information on their pension to calculate the value of pension wealth (REPORT=0), we 
set KNOW_LEVEL equal to zero.  We do this also for similar variables discussed below.  Among 
those with REPORT equal to one, Table 2 shows that 51 percent of our sample report levels of 
pension wealth relatively close to those based on the employer reports.   
Because we are primarily interested in individuals’ knowledge of the financial incentive 
to retire inherent in their pension structure, we use a third measure that captures the accuracy of 
individuals’ knowledge of their pension gain.  After calculating each individual’s pension gain 
using both self- and employer-reported values, the variable KNOW_GAIN is set equal to one if 
the ratio of pension gain based on self- and employer- reports is between 0.5 and 2, or if one is 
zero and the other is within $5,000.  Table 2 shows that 27 percent of our sample are well-
informed regarding this more complex measure of the incentive effects of pensions.  This 
measure requires individuals to understand benefit eligibility ages, amounts and reductions at 
alternative hypothetical retirement ages.  
The second and third columns of Table 2 split the sample into those with and without an 
active defined benefit plan (based on the employer-report).
8  For both REPORT and 
KNOW_LEVEL, those with a DB plan are more knowledgeable than those without.  However, 
when the knowledge measure is based on knowing actual pension gain (KNOW_GAIN), 
individuals with a DB plan are far less likely to be informed.  This is not surprising since DB 
plans are usually associated with a more complex incentive structure. 
Finally, we construct a measure of knowledge that captures whether individuals simply 
understand the sign of their pension gain.  KNOW_SIGN is equal to one if the employer- and  
                                                 
8 Some workers excluded from this column may have defined benefit plans from previous employers.   11 
 
self-reports of pension gain are both positive, both negative, or if both are equal to zero.  Fifty-
five percent of individuals reporting key pension values have self-reports that lead to a pension 
gain of the same sign as the employer-report. 
The knowledge measures that include Social Security are constructed in a similar fashion 
to those for private pensions only.  Unfortunately, the self-reported data on expected Social 
Security benefits are much less extensive than the self-reported pension data.  Specifically, 
individuals are asked only for their expected Social Security benefit amount at their expected 
retirement age.  Thus, for Social Security, we can only create a knowledge measure, KNOW_SS, 
that indicates whether the expected level of benefits at that expected retirement age is close to the 
level we calculate from Social Security Administration data.
9  It is not possible to construct a 
measure similar to KNOW_GAIN for Social Security benefits.  Another limitation is that only a 
single respondent per household was asked to provide expected benefit information.  To avoid 
using a spouse’s knowledge of Social Security benefits to determine an individual’s behavior, we 
include only those individuals who directly report their own expected Social Security benefit in 
this analysis.  Just 40 percent of the sample report their anticipated Social Security benefits, with 
most of the missing reports the result of the relevant household member not being asked the 
question.  Among the subsample providing information on expected Social Security benefits, 
more than three-quarters are reasonably accurate in their expected benefit level.  
 
                                                 
9 In calculating Social Security benefit levels we consider benefits available based on both own and spouse’s 
earnings histories, and choose the larger of the two benefit levels as the one relevant to decision-making.   12 
 
II.  Empirical Strategy and Results 
 
A. Comparing the Effect of Self- and Administratively-Reported Financial Retirement 
Incentives on Retirement 
  We begin by directly comparing the effect of financial retirement incentives, calculated 
from employer- and self-reported pension data.  Following much recent empirical work, we 
estimate a retirement equation described by: 
[2]  it it it it X GAIN R ε β β β + + + = 1 0  
where Rit is a binary variable indicating that individual i retires in year t, and ε is an error term.  
GAINit represents the pension gain to continued work, as defined above, based on employer-
reported pension data.  Samwick (1998) and Coile and Gruber (2000) show that forward-looking 
measures such as pension gain have greater explanatory power than alternative myopic summary 
measures of financial status or incentives.  Xit is a vector that contains control variables, 
including: race, education, gender, self-reported health status, marital status, dummy variables 
for age, the level of non-pension assets, a measure of average lifetime earnings
10, and dummies 
for the survey wave.  In results not reported, we have also included indicators for retiree health 
insurance and an insurance indicator interacted with poor health.  Adding these controls does not 
change our basic results and they are excluded here because of a large number of missing values 
for the retiree health insurance variables.      
                                                 
10 See Coile and Gruber (2000) for a discussion of the importance of carefully controlling for measures of lifetime 
earnings.  It is also crucial to control fully for age because there are spikes and non-linearities in the age profile of 
retirement probabilities and because knowledge may also be correlated with age.  Thus, we include a series of 
dummy variables for each year of age (51 to 70) in our sample.   13 
 
  The first column of Table 3 shows the effects of pension gain from the employer-reports 
on the probability of retirement using a probit model and all sample observations.  Standard 
errors have been corrected to account for repeated observations from the same individual across 
survey waves.  We present results for men and women pooled, although we have also obtained 
similar results when we estimate separate regressions for men and women.
 11   
  As expected, the pension gain variable is negative and significant, implying that a larger 
gain to delaying retirement until a future optimal date reduces the likelihood of retirement.  The 
estimated coefficient of –0.0179 shown in the first column implies that a $10,000 increase in 
pension gain would reduce the probability of retirement by approximately a quarter of a 
percentage point, or 3 percent.
12  This magnitude is very close to that reported by Coile and 
Gruber (2000) for a similar measure including both pensions and Social Security.  As in some 
earlier research, we find that the level of pension wealth (if retirement occurs immediately) has a 
positive and significant effect, suggesting that those with higher levels of pension wealth are 
more likely to retire.
 13  The magnitude of this pension wealth effect, also similar to previous 
work, is quite small, with a $10,000 increment to pension wealth increasing retirement by less 
than one-tenth of a percentage point.  
In the next column, we repeat the exercise, but restrict the sample to individuals who 
have valid self-reports of their pensions (REPORT=1).  The coefficient on pension gain rises 
slightly, but is not significantly different from that in the first column, suggesting that restricting 
                                                 
11 While none of the regression results shown below use the HRS sampling weights, we have estimated all 
specifications using these weights and find no substantive differences in our results from weighting. 
12 Marginal reported effects are shown in italics below the standard errors in the tables and are calculated for a 60-
year old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables 
set to their mean values.  
13 We should note that some other previous work has not found a significant effect of the level of pension wealth on 
retirement probabilities.  Samwick (1998), for example, finds that the level of pension wealth has no effect on 
retirement once a forward-looking incentive measure is included in the model.  Overall, however, these basic results 
are consistent both with theoretical predictions and with previous empirical work.   14 
 
the sample to those with valid self-reported pension values does not systematically alter the 
response to pension incentives. 
  In the third column of Table 3, we use pension gain and pension wealth variables based 
on individuals’ self-reports.  The coefficient on pension gain based on the self-reports is very 
close to the comparable coefficients based on employer reports and is statistically significant.  In 
the fourth column, we include both the self- and employer-based versions of pension gain and 
pension wealth levels.  The correlation between the two measures of pension gain is 0.22.  When 
both are included together (in column 4), the self-reported pension gain variable remains 
statistically significant and is somewhat larger in magnitude than the employer-reported variable.  
This indicates that, rather than being dominated by noise, the self-reported data contain 
important information relevant for individual decision-making.  For pension wealth levels, the 
employer-reported data remain statistically significant (although quite small), while the self-
reported version does not.  
 
B.  Are Well-Informed Individuals More Responsive? 
  We next document differences in the responsiveness of individuals to financial incentives 
based on a variety of measures of their understanding of these incentives.  To capture this 
possible heterogeneity, we modify [2] to allow a differential response by the knowledge of 
pension incentives: 
[3]  it it it it it it it X INFORMED GAIN INFORMED GAIN R ε β α α α α + + + + + = * 3 2 1 0  
where, as before, Rit is a binary variable indicating that the individual i retires in year t, GAINit, is 
the pension gain to continued work based on employer-reported pension data, and ε is an error 
term.  With the exception of the terms associated with coefficients  2 α  and  3 α , this specification   15 
 
is identical to that used in previous work.  INFORMEDit is one of the variables described above 
(and summarized in Table 2) that attempts to capture the extent of individuals’ knowledge of 
their pension benefits.   
  Probit estimates of [3] are shown in Table 4.  For ease of comparison, the first column 
replicates the results from the first column of Table 3 and shows the negative and statistically 
significant effect of pension gain on the probability of retirement when knowledge is ignored.  
Marginal effects implied by the probit coefficients are shown at the bottom of the table, along 
with the change in the retirement probability implied by the dummy variables for our various 
measures of information. 
In column 2 of Table 4, we show that REPORT=1 (knowing, or at least reporting some 
guess of, the key components of a pension plan) is associated with an increased probability of 
retirement.  Reporting all of the key pension plan values is associated with an annual probability 
of retirement that is approximately 4 percentage points higher.  This may reflect reverse 
causality: individuals who are actively considering retirement may be more likely to know 
enough to report some values for their pension plan.  There is no significant interaction between 
this information measure and pension gain.  
 Column 3 of Table 4 displays results using KNOW_LEVEL (being reasonably well-
informed about the level of pension wealth).  These results suggest that individuals with better 
knowledge of their pension plans may show a greater responsiveness to pension-related 
incentives in making the retirement decision.  The total effect of pension gain is statistically 
significant only for well-informed individuals (pension gain plus KNOW_LEVEL * pension 
gain).  However, the interaction between KNOW_LEVEL and pension gain is not itself 
statistically different from zero.    16 
 
In column 4 of Table 4, we use KNOW_GAIN (being reasonably well-informed about the 
size of pension gain) and its interaction with pension gain.  This specification produces much 
stronger evidence of heterogeneity in responsiveness to pension incentives, as we would expect 
since pension gain itself is the measure of the incentive to retire.  The main coefficient on 
pension gain, capturing the effect of employer reported pension gain for individuals whose self-
reports are substantially different than their employer reports (or who do not report enough 
information to construct it), is very small and no longer statistically significant.  The interaction 
between pension gain and KNOW_GAIN, however, is significant and implies a marginal effect 
that is over five times as large as the coefficient on pension gain by itself in column 1.  This 
suggests that all of the responsiveness to pension incentives is driven by the roughly 20 percent 
of the sample who correctly perceive the incentive to delay retirement.  Among individuals who 
meet this definition of informed, a $10,000 increase in pension gain raises the annual probability 
of retirement by 1.4 percentage points, or nearly 20 percent.  The main effect of KNOW_GAIN is 
also large and statistically significant: individuals who know their pension gain are 4 percentage 
points more likely to retire in a given year. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 repeat some of the above analysis using the measure of 
GAIN constructed from both pensions and Social Security.  As noted above, the sample size is 
dramatically reduced when we require both self- and administratively-reported data on Social 
Security.  The coefficient on GAIN combining both pension and Social Security benefits in 
column 5 is slightly smaller than the effect of pension incentives alone, and is statistically 
significant.  However, knowledge of the level of these Social Security benefits is not 
significantly related to retirement behavior: neither the main effect nor the interaction effect is 
statistically significant.  We view this result primarily as a reflection of the limited data we have   17 
 
available on individuals’ knowledge of their Social Security benefits.   
Finally, in columns 7 and 8, we show results based on the sample of individuals with a 
defined benefit pension.  As discussed further below, employer-reported pensions are more likely 
to represent the true pensions for DB plans.  These results are similar to those for the full sample.  
Results based on individuals without an active DB pension (not shown in the table) are also 
similar, though less precisely estimated.  This reflects the fact that most of the identification of 
the pension gain coefficient is coming from defined benefit pensions, for which pension gain 
takes on a wider range of values at different ages. 
We have also tried specifications in which we drop from the sample individuals who do 
not report enough information to form a self-reported measure of pension gain (REPORT=0 and 
thus, INFORMED=0).  This allows us to distinguish between individuals who simply do not 
report information on their pensions and those who report values that are very different from 
their employer-reports.  These coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 3. 
  We have explored several alternative definitions of the knowledge variables.  In 
particular, we tried altering the definition of KNOW_GAIN to allow for different degrees of error 
in determining who knew their pension gain accurately.  For example, we considered definitions 
in which the ratio of self- to employer-reported pension gain was between 0.75 and 1.25, and 
other cut-offs.  The coefficients on KNOW_GAIN were not sensitive to these cutoffs.  This 
suggested that individuals were responding to something other than the precise dollar values of 
their pension gain.  One possibility is that individuals retire when they face a zero gain or a loss 
from continuing to work.  If this is the case, it may be enough if individuals simply understand 
the sign of their pension gain.  To explore this possibility, we use KNOW_SIGN (knowing the 
sign of pension gain) as the measure of pension knowledge.   18 
 
  The results of interacting KNOW_SIGN with pension gain are shown in Table 5.  Column 
1 simply repeats the first column of Tables 3 and 4 for ease of comparison.  In column 2, we 
show that there is no statistically significant response to pension gain among the roughly two-
thirds of the sample who do not know whether they stand to gain or lose pension wealth from 
continuing to work.  In contrast, those who know the sign of pension gain have the expected 
negative and significant response to the financial incentive measure, and again, the magnitude of 
their response is over five times that of the average response to pension gain from column 1.   
Finally, since the sign of pension gain appears to be an important piece of individual 
knowledge, we consider whether the sign alone can explain retirement behavior.  In column 3 of 
Table 5 we show results of a model of retirement in which dummies for negative and zero 
pension gain are included (the omitted category is positive pension gain).  The dummy for a 
negative pension gain is positive and significant, consistent with those who are past their pension 
wealth peak being substantially more likely to retire; the retirement probability is almost doubled 
for those with negative pension gain.  Surprisingly, the dummy on pension gain equal to zero is 
negative.  Column 4 shows this specification with the relevant interactions with KNOW_SIGN.  
In the lower half of Table 5, we illustrate the magnitudes of these estimated effects by 
calculating the probability of retirement for all combinations of KNOW_SIGN and whether 
pension gain is positive, zero, or negative.  There are much larger differences between those with 
positive and negative pension gain values among the well-informed group, with probabilities 
ranging from 0.027 to 0.242.  In contrast, those who are not informed according to this measure 
show very little difference in retirement probabilities with pension gain.  It is also worth noting 
that the main effect of this knowledge measure does not always serve to increase the probability 
of retirement.  For individuals with a positive pension gain (i.e., those who can increase pension   19 
 
wealth by deferring retirement into the future), being knowledgeable actually reduces the 
probability of retirement from 0.068 to 0.027.  This provides evidence that at least some of the 
main effect of knowledge does not reflect a reverse causality in which individuals only become 
informed when they are on the verge of retirement. 
Nevertheless, we have further considered this alternative explanation for our findings of 
stronger responsiveness among the knowledgeable individuals.  If individuals do not actively 
collect information about their pensions until they are seriously considering retirement, then 
unobserved individual characteristics may make individuals both more likely to be well-
informed, and more likely to retire.  We have attempted to explore this possibility directly by 
estimating a selection model in which the level of information about one’s pension is estimated 
jointly with the decision to retire.  Such a model, however, is unlikely to be identified 
empirically since it requires data on factors that help predict individual knowledge about their 
pension, but that can be excluded from a model of the retirement decision.  We are not convinced 
that such factors exist, and so do not report the full results from our selection model here.  None 
of our main results are altered by allowing for selection into informed and not informed states.
14 
In the next section, we further consider the appropriate interpretation of our results, but 
taken at face value, they suggest significant “mistakes” in retirement decision-making, as the 
result of misinformation.  If the costs of obtaining information on one’s pension are reasonably 
low, this raises questions about the value of the information.  How costly is it, for example, to 
retire according to one’s perceived pension incentive, rather than the true incentive?  To address  
                                                 
14 In our estimation of the selection model we use union status, having multiple pension plans, firm size, and time 
left to the pension wealth-maximizing age to identify the level of knowledge, and exclude these factors from the 
retirement model.    20 
 
this, we calculate the difference in the present value of pension wealth (from the employer 
reports) if retirement occurs at the wealth maximizing age, versus the present value if retirement 
occurs at the self-reported wealth maximizing age (but using wealth values from the employer 
reports).  While not all individuals will retire at the wealth maximizing age, this gives us a rough 
idea of the potential cost of responding to perceived pension incentives rather than the true 
incentives.  For the full sample of individuals with both employer- and self-reports of pension 
values, the median difference in pension wealth calculated in this way is roughly $3,000, or 3 
percent of the maximum pension wealth from the employer reports.  This, of course, includes 
very small differences for those who are well-informed.  When we calculate this gap among the 
uninformed, the values are substantial.  Among those with KNOW_GAIN=0, the median 
reduction in maximum pension wealth from misinformation is $6,900, or roughly 6 percent of 
pension wealth at the wealth maximizing age.  The 75th percentile of this distribution is more 
than $20,000, or 18 percent of pension wealth.  Similarly, among those with KNOW_SIGN=0,  
the median difference in pension wealth at the employer- and self-reported wealth maximizing 
ages is more than $9,000, and the 75th percentile difference is almost $24,000.  While it can be 
subjective to categorize magnitudes as large or small, it does not seem easy to dismiss these 
dollar amounts as economically unimportant.  Individuals who do not have detailed pension 
information may stand to lose substantial portions of their pension wealth.
15 
 
                                                 
15 If individuals work longer than suggested by their pension wealth-maximizing retirement age, they will make up 
some of this reduced wealth through higher earnings.  However, because roughly similar numbers of individuals 
retire before as retire after the optimal age, this cannot fully offset the reductions in pension wealth.    21 
 
C.  Do Uninformed Individuals Respond to Perceived Incentives? 
  One interpretation of the results thus far is that knowledge can have powerful effects on 
individual behavior.  We are cautious in reaching such a conclusion, however, since it is likely 
that at least some information acquisition is not exogenous to the retirement decision.  One 
possible explanation for our finding of stronger responsiveness among the knowledgeable, for 
example, is that individuals might determine how much information to gather based on how 
likely they are to take account of that information in making retirement decisions.  In this case, 
causality runs from dispersion in responsiveness to dispersion in knowledge and some 
individuals will be uninformed because they have no intention of taking financial incentives into 
account in choosing a retirement date.   
  This poses a challenge for estimation of causal effects, similar to the issues raised in the 
literature on estimating heterogeneous returns to education (see Card, 1999, for a discussion).  
Given the lack of any convincing instruments for pension knowledge in this situation, we cannot 
formally rule out this possibility.  However, by considering the role that self-reported pension 
incentives play in retirement decisions, we are able to provide some evidence that this form of 
endogeneity is not driving our results.  If it is simply the case that those who are responsive 
gather information, while those who are unresponsive do not (because information collection is 
costly and does not benefit them in any way), then the non-responders should not respond to any 
pension information, including their own self-reported information.  We have shown above that 
misinformed individuals do not respond to the administratively reported pension incentive, but 
do these same misinformed individuals respond to their self-reported and objectively incorrect 
incentive?  Or, are they simply nonresponsive to any incentive whatsoever?   
  Table 6 produces results analogous to those in Table 4, but focuses on self-reported   22 
 
pension information (rather than employer-reports) interacted with the knowledge measures.  
The first column simply reproduces column 2 of Table 3, where we estimated the average effect 
of employer-reported pension gain on retirement for the sample with a valid self-report.  In the 
second column, we use self-reported pension gain, KNOW_GAIN, and their interaction.  The 
coefficient on self-reported pension gain by itself, which reflects the responsiveness of 
misinformed individuals, is statistically significant and of similar magnitude to the average 
responsiveness to employer-reported pension gain in column 1.  Thus, misinformed individuals 
nevertheless respond to their perceived incentive in making their retirement decisions.  The 
better-informed group has a much larger response to self-reported pension gain, as shown by the 
interaction of KNOW_GAIN and pension gain.  Because better informed individuals do respond 
more strongly to their self-reported pension gain than the uninformed group, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of the type of reverse causation described above.  The fact that the uninformed do 
show a statistically significant response to their perceived pensions, however, also suggests that 
at least some of the effect is running from individuals’ information sets to their behavior.  The 
results in the third column are even more striking: there is only a small difference in the 
responsiveness of informed and misinformed individuals to their own perceptions of pension 
gain when our measure of knowledge is simply whether they are aware of the sign of their 
incentive.   
 
D.  Can Measurement Error Explain these Results? 
  Our results thus far suggest a potentially important role for self-reported pension data, or 
individual knowledge of pension details, in retirement decision-making.  Other possible 
interpretations of these results arise, however, if we take seriously the possibility of measurement   23 
 
error in the employer-reported data, as well as in the self-reported data.  Work by Rohwedder 
(2003), Engelhardt (2003), and Uccello and Perese (1999) point to several ways that 
measurement error could affect the employer-reported pension data.  One concern is that for 
individuals with defined contribution (DC) pensions, employers may not have full access to 
information regarding account balances (particularly if there are multiple plans from earlier 
employers) or voluntary contributions.  This is the motivation for restricting the sample to 
individuals with DB pensions (according to the employer reports), as was done in Table 4.  
Given the similarity between results with and without the DC pension plans, it seems unlikely 
that this type of measurement error in the employer reports is driving our results.  
  Measurement error may also exist in the employer reports of DB pension plans, however.  
Plans may change, or employers with multiple plans could report on the wrong one for a given 
employee.  In addition, data on years of service (often a critical determinant of DB pension 
eligibility amounts) are taken from individual self-reports of their start dates on the job.  This 
suggests that our assumption that the employer-reported pensions represent the “true” pension 
may not be valid.  On the other hand, Rohwedder (2003) acknowledges that “for capturing 
important retirement incentives that are associated with sudden increases in entitlements at the 
time of the early and normal retirement age…this employer information can be very valuable, 
especially if estimating retirement models that are particularly sensitive even to small 
mismeasurement of the incentive structure, like option value models.”  Rohwedder goes on to 
note that for measurements of the level of pension wealth, the employer-provided data are less 
obviously well-suited.   
Given the two available sources of pension data, it is probably impossible to account for 
measurement error and the role of information simultaneously.  It is instructive, however, to   24 
 
consider an alternative to the interpretation we have given our results that relies primarily on 
measurement error as the driving factor.  Recall that our definition of “informed” and 
“uninformed” simply reflect whether the self- and employer- reports are similar to one another.  
Individuals that we classify as “uninformed” may actually be those who have particularly severe 
measurement error in their employer-reported data.  (Of course, such individuals could also be 
those with substantial measurement error in the self-reported data.)  Informed individuals may 
appear to respond more to pension incentives simply because the measured incentives contain 
less measurement error.    
  If measurement error is of substantial concern in both the self- and employer-reported 
data, then an alternative estimation strategy would be to instrument the pension gain based on 
employer-reports with the pension gain based on self-reports, and vice-versa.  Note that the 
strategy of instrumenting employer-reported pension variables with the self-reports will only be 
sensible if there is not an independent role in the retirement decision for individual knowledge.
16  
If the self-reports, or individual knowledge, directly affect the retirement decision, the self-
reports will not be a valid instrument, since they cannot be excluded from the retirement 
equation.  Nonetheless, the instrumental variables exercise will be informative under the 
hypothesis that only measurement error (and not individual knowledge) is a key determinant of 
the estimated responsiveness of individuals to pension incentives as measured from the different 
data sources.  
  Table 7 shows the results from OLS and IV regressions in which we (i) instrument the 
self-reports with the employer-reports and (ii) instrument the employer-reports with the self-
reports, for both the full sample and the sample of those with DB plans only.  If both sources of  
                                                 
16 We also assume that measurement error in the two pension variables are independent of one another.    25 
 
data provide poorly measured proxies for the pension incentives faced by well-informed 
individuals, we should expect the two IV estimates to be similar to one another.  This is not the 
case.  Columns 1 & 2 show the results from OLS and IV regressions in which the self-reported 
pension gain variable is the key independent variable, instrumented with the employer-reported 
version.  This suggests substantial measurement error in the self-reports since the IV coefficient 
is roughly 3 times as large as the OLS coefficient when using the full sample.
17  For the sample 
of individuals with DB pensions, the IV and OLS estimates are not statistically different from 
one another, and the IV estimate is quite imprecisely estimated.  
In columns 3 & 4 of Table 7, we present results using the employer-reported values, and 
those values instrumented with the self-reports.  The evidence here is consistent with a bias in 
the IV estimate.  The IV coefficient is almost 40 times the size of the OLS coefficient.  This is 
virtually impossible to explain as the result of measurement error, but is quite sensible when 
viewed as the result of using an invalid instrument.  More specifically, if an individual’s 
knowledge of their pension is an important determinant of retirement behavior, the IV coefficient 
will be biased, and the bias term will be given by the ratio of the covariance of the self-reports 
and the error-term of the retirement equation to the covariance between the self- and employer-
reported pension gain.
18  The IV results in columns 3 and 4 are thus consistent with an important 
role for individual perceptions of pension details in the retirement equation, even after 
conditioning on the employer report (as a proxy for the true pension), but are difficult to explain 
relying only on measurement error.  In truth, our results may be driven by a combination of  
                                                 
17 This result could also occur if having a correct self-report (one that is highly correlated with the true pension gain) 
leads to greater responsiveness; individuals may simply respond less to a best guess of their pension that they know 
is unlikely to be accurate. 
18 That is, let X-sr be the self-reported pension gain, X-er be the employer-reported pension gain, and e be the 
retirement equation error term.  Then the bias on the IV coefficient is given by Cov(X-sr,e)/( Cov(X-er,X-sr).     26 
 
measurement error and a role for individual perceptions or knowledge.  Given the prior 
literature’s almost exclusive focus on administrative data, and the lack of attention to the role of 
individual knowledge in determining retirement timing, our findings, at the least, highlight an 
important new factor in understanding retirement decisions. 
 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper documents the differential responsiveness to economic incentives by 
knowledge of those incentives in the case of retirement decision-making.  Specifically, we have 
shown that there is important heterogeneity in how individuals consider financial factors in 
choosing a retirement date, and that this heterogeneity is directly related to individuals’ level of 
knowledge about these financial factors.  This finding is important since the existing literature on 
retirement decision-making has largely ignored information issues, and since researchers have 
tended to ignore self-reported data on pensions when they are available.  A limitation of our 
findings is that we cannot yet say whether they reflect an exogenous effect of information 
provision, or whether information gathering and retirement decision making are jointly 
determined.  Future work should focus on disentangling this difficult empirical problem.  Finally, 
we show that, rather than being unresponsive, misinformed individuals do respond to their 
perceived, but incorrect, pension information.   
  A final contribution of this study is that we demonstrate the usefulness of self-reported 
data as collected in the Health and Retirement Study and other surveys.  Individuals respond 
directly to these self-reports, suggesting that they do capture the economic incentives that   27 
 
individuals perceive themselves to be facing.  The self-reported pension data provide an 
important intermediate step between administrative reports of pensions and the retirement 
response of individuals.  Instead of being substitutes for one another, the self- and 
administratively-reported data are complements in understanding individual responses to 
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Total non-pension assets $ 277,655 688,461
Average Lifetime Earnings $ 23,385 11,836
Pension wealth if retire immediately (self-report) $ 68,794 290,577
Pension wealth if retire immediately (employer-report) $ 153,218 251,503
Pension gain (self-report) $ 56,534 154,064
Pension gain (employer-report) $ 25,152 46,813
Number of observations 8,471
Notes: Pooled data from waves 1-4 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  
The sample includes all HRS respondents for whom there is an employer-reported pension at wave 1.  
Further details are given in section I of the text.
Table 1
Sample Summary StatisticsSample: Full With a With no
DB plan DB plan
Fraction reporting key values of pension (REPORT=1) 0.63 0.68 0.56
Among those reporting key values of pension:
Fraction with KNOW_LEVEL = 1 0.51 0.55 0.43
(ratio of employer to self- reported level of pension wealth is between 0.5 and 2)
Fraction with KNOW_GAIN = 1 0.27 0.20 0.42
(ratio of employer to self- reported level of pension gain is between 0.5 and 2)
0.55 0.59 0.49
(employer and self- reported pension gain is of the same sign.)
Fraction reporting expected Social Security benefits 0.40 0.42 0.32
Among those reporting expected Social Security benefits:
Fraction with KNOW_SS = 1 0.77 0.75 0.79
( ratio of SSA- to self- reported expected SS benefits between 0.5 and 2.)
Number of observations 8,471 5,207 3,264   
Notes: Pooled data from waves 1-4 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  
The sample includes all HRS respondents for whom there is an employer-reported pension at wave 1.  
Further details are given in section I of the text.
Table 2
Measures of KnowledgeDependent Variable:
Sample: Full
1 234
Pension gain based on employer-report -0.0179 -0.0190 -0.0168
(0.0080) (0.0093) (0.0098)
-0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0024
Pension wealth level based on employer-report 0.0054 0.0049 0.0061
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0018)
0.0007 0.0007 0.0009
Pension gain based on self-report -0.0213 -0.0228
(0.0029) (0.0027)
-0.0034 -0.0032
Pension wealth level based on self-report 0.0014 0.0010
(0.0011) (0.0010)
0.0002 0.0001
Correlation(pension gain based on employer-report,  0.22
    pension gain based on self-report)
Correlation(pension wealth level based on employer-report,  0.21
    pension wealth level based on self-report)
Number of observations 8,471 5,368 5,368 5,368
Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS.  Standard errors are in (  ).
The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in the variable (calculated for a 60-year old, married, white 
male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables set to their mean 
values) is shown in italics below the standard errors.
The sample in columns 2-4 include only those for whom a self-reported pension gain can be calculated.
Pension gain and wealth levels are in $10,000s.  
Other explanatory variables include race, education, health, marital status, non-pension assets, age,
gender, wave, lifetime earnings and an intercept.
Table 3
The Effect of Self- and Employer-Reported Pension Gain on the Annual Probability of Retirement
Retire
With REPORT=1 onlyDependent Variable:
Sample:
1234 56 78
Pension gain -0.0179 -0.0179 -0.0120 -0.0046 -0.0222 -0.0090











(KNOW_GAIN=1)*Pension gain -0.0950 -0.0996
(0.0323) (0.0356)




(KNOW_SS=1)*Pension and  -0.0047
                    Social Security gain (0.0124)
Effect of $10,000 increase in pension gain:
     average -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0031
     uninformed -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0012
     informed -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0136 -0.0014 -0.0149
Change in P(retire) due to
     main effect of informed: 0.0436 0.0211 0.0436 0.0044 0.0468
Number of observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471 3,341 3,341 5,207 5,207
Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS.  Standard errors are in (  ).
The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in pension gain and the change in probability of retirement is calculated for a 
60-year old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables 
set to their mean values.
Pension gain is in $10,000s and are based on employer-reports.  
Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, non-pension assets, age, 





The Effect of Pension Gain and Knowledge on the Annual Probability of Retirement
Self-reporting SS FullDependent Variable:
Sample:
1234






Pension gain=0 -0.1241 -0.4622
(0.0654) (0.0825)
Pension gain<0 0.4274 0.1185
(0.0590) (0.0684)
(KNOW_SIGN=1) and (Pension gain=0) 0.9927
(0.1371)
(KNOW_SIGN=1) and (Pension gain<0) 1.1129
(0.1137)
P(retire) for KNOW_SIGN=1:
    employer reported pension gain > 0 0.0268
    employer reported pension gain = 0 0.0807
    employer reported pension gain < 0 0.2422
P(retire) for KNOW_SIGN=0:
    employer reported pension gain > 0 0.0681
    employer reported pension gain = 0 0.0255
    employer reported pension gain < 0 0.0851
Number of observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471
Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS.  Standard errors are in (  ).
Pension gain is in $10,000s and are based on employer-reports.  
Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, 




The Effect of Knowing the Sign of Pension Gain on the Annual Probability of RetirementDependent Variable:
Sample:
123
Employer reported pension gain -0.0190
(0.0093)








(KNOW_SIGN=1)*Self-reported pension gain -0.0115
(0.0062)
Effect of $10,000 increase in self-reported pension gain:
     not informed -0.0014 -0.0024
     informed -0.0086 -0.0042
Change in P(retire) due to main effect of informed: 0.0154 0.0028
Number of observations 5,368 5,368 5,368
Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS.  Standard errors are in (  ).
The sample includes only those for whom a self-reported pension gain can be calculated.
The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in pension gain and the change in probability of retirement is 
calculated for a 60-year old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with 
all continuous variables set to their mean values.
Self- and employer-reported pension gain are in $10,000s.  
Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, non-pension




The Effect of Self-Reported Pension Gain and Knowledge on the Annual Probability of RetirementDependent Variable: 
Sample: Full DB plans only Full DB plans only
Pension gain from:
12 34
OLS -0.008 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
IV -0.024 -0.005 -0.429 -0.494
(0.012) (0.007) (0.174) (0.158)
Note: IV estimates in columns 1 & 2 are for self-reported pension gain instrumented
with employer reported. IV estimates in columns 3 & 4 are for employer-reported 
pension gain instrumented with self-reported.
Self-reports Employer-reports
Table 7
OLS & IV Estimates of Self- and Employer-Reported Pension Gain
Retire
on the Annual Probability of Retirement